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shape current fiscal institutions. Economic historians claim that greater fiscal capacity
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1 Introduction
A large body of work places institutions that secure individual property rights at the
forefront of economic development.1 This view suggests that parliamentary limits
on executives reduce tax predation and encourage private investment. The focus on
predatory states, however, discounts the positive economic roles that governments
may play. A more recent literature examines fiscal capacity, defined as the ability of
states to raise tax revenues.2 Non-state elites in less developed countries may resist
fiscal control by central governments, leading states to underinvest in public services
that improve worker productivity.3
This view receives support from the existing evidence. Political scientists find a
close relationship between small fiscal capacity and lack of development in Africa,
where traditional elite groups (bosses, chiefs, clan leaders, landlords, rich peasants)
have consistently opposed tax reforms. The successful development experiences of
Asian Tiger nations, by contrast, took place under powerful fiscal states.4
Nonetheless, we lack systematic estimates of the effect of fiscal capacity on eco-
nomic performance. It is likely that wealthy economies choose or at least have the
ability to choose strong fiscal systems. Economies that are different for a variety of
reasons, moreover, may differ in terms of fiscal institutions and worker productivity.
To estimate the impact of fiscal capacity on performance, we need a plausible
source of exogenous variation in fiscal institutions. In this paper, we relate current
fiscal differences among countries to pre-modern wars, which we use to derive a pos-
sible source. We base our argument on the following premises. First, states fought
different amounts of external conflicts, of various lengths and magnitudes. Second, to
raise the revenues to wage wars, states made fiscal innovations. Economic historians
claim that greater fiscal capacity was the key long-run institutional change brought
about by historical conflicts. Third, the impact of past innovations on fiscal systems
persisted to the present. We discuss our hypothesis at length and provide historical
1For theory, see Brennan and Buchanan (1980), North (1981), and Levi (1988). For empirics, see De Long
and Shleifer (1993), Knack and Keefer (1995), and Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002, 2005).
2See Acemoglu et al. (2004, 2011), Glaeser et al. (2004), Acemoglu (2005), and Besley and Persson (2008,
2009, 2010, 2011).
3For instance, Galor et al. (2009) show that concentrated landownership results in a lower tax rate and
underinvestment in education.
4For Africa, see Migdal (1988), Herbst (2000), and Bates (2001). For East Asia, see Wade (1990) and Kang
(2002).
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evidence in Section 2.
Given these premises, we use measures of pre-modern wars as instruments for
current fiscal systems. Not all conflicts, however, were created equal. Bigger wars
required greater funds, and thus more fiscal innovations. Although military expen-
ditures or government debts would be ideal measures of war magnitudes, systematic
historical data do not exist. Given the lack of fiscal information that is available, any
alternative indicator must provide a succinct measure of the scope of past conflicts
that is comparable across countries.
Historical war casualties are one unique source of data that satisfy this condition.
We compile a new database on total casualties for all major external conflicts from
1816 to 1913 in Western and Eastern Europe, North and Sub-Saharan Africa, the Mid-
dle East and Central Asia, the British Indian Empire, East and Southeast Asia and
Oceania, the United States and Canada, the Caribbean, and South America from the
statistical reference of Clodfelter (2002). This work is a comprehensive source of his-
torical data on armed conflicts. For robustness, we compile a second database (also
from Clodfelter, 2002) on total casualties for all major external conflicts from 1700 to
1788. As a further check, we construct a third instrument for the number of total
battle-related deaths in major external conflicts from 1816 to 1913 from the Correlates
of War database of Sarkees (2000). Finally, we construct controls for the total number
of wars, years at war, and conflict types. We discuss our war casualty instruments at
length in Section 4.
There is a strong positive relationship between current GDP per worker and pre-
modern war casualties for our sample of 96 countries: states in the top decile of past
war casualties are 80 percent more productive today than states with no recorded
casualties.5 We argue that this relationship reflects the effect of pre-modern fiscal
innovations on current fiscal institutions. We test our claim by regressing current eco-
nomic performance on current fiscal capacity, where we instrument for the latter by
pre-modern war casualties. Our key measure of fiscal capacity is the share of total tax
revenues from direct taxes (i.e., income, social security, payroll, and property taxes).
We justify this choice in Section 3. As an alternative fiscal capacity measure, we also
use the ratio of total tax revenues to GDP.
There is a strong positive first-stage relationship between pre-modern wars and
5The coefficient for the OLS regression of past war casualties on log GDP per worker is 1.03, with stan-
dard deviation 0.35, making it significant at the 1 percent level.
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current fiscal systems: countries in the top decile of pre-modern war casualties have
fiscal capacities that are 22 percentage points higher than countries with no recorded
casualties.6 Our two-stage least-squares estimates of the impact of fiscal institutions
on performance are statistically significant and substantial. They imply, for instance,
that raising Chad’s fiscal capacity to the level of South Korea would more than double
Chad’s worker productivity.
The exclusion restriction that our instrumental variable regressions rely upon is
that, conditional on the included controls, casualties sustained in pre-modern con-
flicts have no effect on current economic performance other than their impact on fiscal
systems. We claim that our exclusion restriction is plausible. As described, economic
historians argue that greater fiscal capacity was the key long-run institutional change
brought about by historical wars. The cut-off year for our benchmark instrument,
1913, comes before World War I (1914-18), where prodigious casuality totals marked
the start of the era of mass modern warfare and weapons of mass destruction (Clod-
felter, 2002).7 Furthermore, this cut-off is well before the post-World War II boom in
social spending which established far-reaching government bureaucracies (Lindert,
2004). The large-scale participation of women in the (wartime) work force was also
a post-1913 phenomenon. To further improve the plausibility of our IV approach,
an alternative instrument measures war casualties for an even earlier era, from 1700
to 1788, the year prior to the French Revolution that marked the end of the Ancien
Re´gime.
If other factors correlated with the estimates of pre-modern war casualties affect
current performance, then the validity of our exclusion restriction is called into ques-
tion. To show that omitted factors do not drive our findings, we test whether fiscal
institutions have comparable effects on performance once we account for a large set of
non-fiscal factors that may be correlated with pre-modern war casualties and current
economic outcomes. The results are robust to controls for geography, country size,
political inclusiveness, government size, trade openness, Great Power status, early
technology, state antiquity, agricultural transitions, past wealth, legal and colonial
origins, religion, fractionalization, and trust.
Although we control for a wide variety of non-fiscal factors, we cannot completely
exclude the possibility that other variables are correlated with pre-modern war casu-
6The coefficient for the OLS regression of past war casualties on fiscal capacity is 0.21, with standard
deviation 0.05, making it significant at the 1 percent level.
7It is for this reason that we refer to all pre-1914 conflicts as “pre-modern.”
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alties and current income per worker. Our investigation could also capture the effect
of historical conflicts on performance through channels beyond fiscal institutions. To
further evaluate the plausibility of the exogeneity assumption, we perform a sensitiv-
ity analysis. This exercise, which shows that our key findings are robust to moderate
violations of the exogeneity restriction, reinforces the plausibility of our IV approach.
Our paper is related to the historical literature on warfare, state formation, and
long-run growth, including Brewer (1989), Tilly (1990), Hoffman and Rosenthal (1997),
O’Brien (2011a,b), and Rosenthal and Wong (2011). While standard theory assumes
that governments are “born” with sufficient tax authority, economic historians study
the evolution of fiscal capacity over time. Warfare, which encouraged fiscal innova-
tions by states in order to raise greater revenues, plays a central role in such accounts.
This literature, however, does not explore the links between past conflicts and current
performance.
In this respect, the closest antecedent to our paper is the recent set of works by
Besley and Persson (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011), which examines the relationships between
conflict, state capacity, and growth over time. These works, however, are largely the-
oretical in nature. The literature still lacks a systematic analysis that rigorously exam-
ines the empirical relationships between wars, fiscal capacity, and long-run produc-
tivity differences.8
Finally, our paper is related to a number of works that study the linkages be-
tween historical factors and development, including Diamond (1997), Engerman and
Sokoloff (1997), La Porta et al. (1998), Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu et al. (2001,
2002, 2005), Nunn (2008, 2009), and Ashraf and Galor (2012).9 None of these studies,
however, focus on fiscal capacity.10
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes our hypoth-
esis and offers historical evidence. Section 3 presents OLS regressions of GDP per
worker on our fiscal capacity measures. Section 4 describes our main instruments for
fiscal capacity, pre-modern war casualties. Section 5 presents the 2SLS results, and
Section 6 investigates the robustness of our findings. Section 7 concludes.
8Scheve and Stasavage (2010, 2012) test for the effects of mass warfare on tax reforms.
9Stylistically, our investigation hews closely to Acemoglu et al. (2001).
10One important exception is Bockstette et al. (2002), which investigates the economic impacts of early
statehood. They find a strong positive link between state antiquity and current development.
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2 Historical Background
We claim that pre-modern wars promoted fiscal innovations which persisted and
helped to shape current fiscal institutions. In this section, we substantiate our hy-
pothesis. We first discuss the relationship between warfare and fiscal change, and
then examine channels of institutional persistence.
2.1 Warfare and Fiscal Change
Economic historians argue that the long-run impact of past military conflicts on public
finances was fundamental. The physical destruction caused by warfare may have had
a negative short-run effect on fiscal institutions. Over the long term, however, Brewer
(1989), Tilly (1990), Hoffman and Rosenthal (1997), O’Brien (2011a,b), and Rosenthal
and Wong (2011) argue that military competition promoted fiscal innovations that
enabled states to raise ever larger tax amounts. These scholars view increases in fiscal
capacity as the key institutional change brought about by historical conflicts.
The historical literature indicates that the capacity (or lack thereof) to raise wartime
funds did not significantly affect decisions to fight. Hoffman and Rosenthal (1997) ar-
gue that the basic aim of early modern rulers was to wage war for royal glory and
homeland defense. One key reason was the problem of royal moral hazard in war-
fare. In Hoffman’s (2009, p. 24) words, monarchs
overspent on the military and provided more defense than their citizens
likely desired. But they had little reason not to. Victory. . . won them glory,
enhanced reputations, and resources . . . Losses never cost them their throne.
Specific historical examples further illustrate this phenomenon. Describing the
Stuart kings of seventeenth-century England, Cox (2011, p. 133) writes:
The Stuarts financed their wars largely with other people’s money. . . If their
wars went well, they repaid their debts out of the spoils of victory and
pocketed the residual. Otherwise, they more often reneged. Thus, kings
who could unilaterally launch wars faced a financial system that punished
defeat too little and rewarded victory too quickly. The Stuarts were accord-
ingly too quick to make war – and too eager to gamble on resurrection,
when wars went badly. . .
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Similarly, Keegan (1994, p. 348) characterizes early modern sovereigns in France
as follows:
The French fiscal system [was] overborne by the demands of incessant
royal war-making through the eighteenth century. . . Warmaking. . . had al-
ways been costly, had bankrupted states before. . . The threat of bankruptcy
through war-making had never yet, however, ushered in an entirely new
philosophy of government.
The historical literature thus supports the claim that war participation drove fiscal
capacity improvements, but that capacity constraints themselves did not significantly
influence whether rulers went to war.
In Europe, the most widely studied region, fiscal change took place over cen-
turies. Yet this process remained largely unfinished through the 1700s. Deep struc-
tural changes often occurred from 1789 onwards (Dincecco, 2009, 2011). Warfare was
a key driver of institutional reform.11 To finance its campaigns against France, for
instance, Britain introduced a modern income tax in 1799. Although repealed in 1802,
the tax was reintroduced the next year with the start of the Napoleonic Wars (1803-
15). France also experimented with new taxes during the 1789-1815 period, as did the
Austrian Empire, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Nordic states like Denmark, Nor-
way, and Sweden (Aidt and Jensen, 2009). Overall, Dincecco (2009, 2011) finds strong
relationships between the establishment of national tax systems around 1800 and in-
creases in tax revenues.
A description of the implementation of the income tax during the nineteenth cen-
tury further illustrates the links between warfare and public finances.12 Denmark in-
troduced temporary income taxation to finance its wars against Prussia in 1848-9 and
1864. During its successful war against Southern states (the Civil War, 1861-5), the U.S.
government not only implemented a temporary income tax to fund military expenses,
but also established the Internal Revenue Service for collection purposes. The Aus-
trian Empire introduced a permanent income tax in 1849, at the time of the Austro-
Sardinian War (1848-9). Similarly, Italy implemented an income tax in 1864, just after
it fought the Franco-Austrian War (1859), and just before it fought the Austro-Prussian
11The long-run fiscal consequences of warfare may vary by context. For Africa, see Herbst (2000). For
Latin America, see Centeno (1997).
12This account follows Clodfelter (2002) and Aidt and Jensen (2009). Also see Scheve and Stasavage
(2010, 2012), who examine the linkages between nineteenth- and twentieth-century wars and progressive
tax reforms.
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War (1866). Finally, Japan established the income tax in 1887, the same year that the
Meiji government defeated the ex-samurai in the large-scale Satsuma Rebellion.13
2.2 Channels of Persistence
There is a large literature that examines how economic and political institutions in
history, ranging from the despotic empires in China, the Ottoman Empire, and Rus-
sia, to colonial structures in the New World, have shaped current institutional envi-
ronments.14 Once implemented, for instance, the income tax has generally become a
fixed feature of the fiscal landscape.
There are several potential channels through which fiscal institutions may persist.
We now describe two possibilities.15 The first is that the establishment of strong fiscal
institutions is costly. In Ancien Re´gime Europe, for example, there was a close rela-
tionship between local tax authority and political autonomy. Hence, traditional eco-
nomic groups (nobles, clergy, residents of certain towns or regions) resisted state con-
trol. The implementation of national tax systems with uniform rates was often the re-
sult of “exogenous” shocks such as conquest by French Revolutionary or Napoleonic
armies (Dincecco, 2009, 2011, Acemoglu et al., 2011). When new executives inherit
strong fiscal institutions, they may wish to exploit them for their own purposes rather
than cede authority back to traditional elites. On the Italian Peninsula after 1815, for
instance, Dincecco et al. (2011) show that restored rulers retained the fiscal reforms
first made by Napoleon, although they relinquished other ancient rights to local elites.
The second possibility is that, if states make irreversible investments that favor
strong fiscal institutions, then they may be more willing to support them, leading to
persistence. For instance, Hoffman and Rosenthal (2000) and Hoffman (2009) claim
that the transition to nascent parliaments took place after 1800 due to a major shift in
the nature of warfare that increased the penalties for defeated rulers. For the first time,
leaders who failed in battle also faced the risk of losing their thrones. In turn, rulers
and elites struck power-sharing bargains, whereby rulers received greater funds to
wage wars, and elites (who coordinated efforts through national representative bod-
13Clearly, there are a wide variety of economic, geographic, legal, political, and social factors that may
be correlated with both past wars and current economic performance. Our econometric analysis explicitly
accounts for these factors.
14See Wittfogel (1957), Engerman and Sokoloff (1997), La Porta et al. (1998), Acemoglu et al. (2001), and
Roland (2010).
15For further possibilities, see Besley and Persson (2011, chs. 2, 3, 5, 8).
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ies) were able to finance a larger portion of the public services that they valued. Once
executives have access to greater military resources, they may prefer to employ them
to the state’s advantage.
3 Capacity and Performance: OLS Results
3.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for the main variables of interest. The Data
Appendix provides details about sources and construction methods. Our key mea-
sure of economic performance is output (GDP) per worker. There are large differ-
ences in performance across our set of 96 sample countries: output per worker in the
top decile of productive countries is nearly 30 times higher than for countries in the
bottom decile. As an alternative, we use total factor productivity from Hall and Jones
(1999). Since the formal labor force is difficult to assess, this variable is less precise
than output per worker.
Recall from Section 1 that we define fiscal capacity as the state’s ability to raise tax
revenues. To measure fiscal capacity, we use two different variables. Our key vari-
able, shown in row 3, is the share of direct taxes (i.e., income, social security, payroll,
and property taxes) in total tax revenues from the Government Financial Statistics
database of the IMF. We average the tax data over the 1990s, because data from the
2000s were not always available.
There are two main reasons why we employ direct tax shares as our key capacity
measure. Lindert (2004) argues that there are important similarities between the his-
torical evolution of tax systems and current differences in tax regimes between rich
and poor countries. The historical transition from tax systems was characterized by
the shift from indirect taxes on trade and excises to those characterized by direct taxes.
This shift, which was completed in rich democracies by the early twentieth century,
led to significant reductions in the costs of tax collection. Fiscal regimes characterized
by direct taxes are thus among the most efficient sorts of tax systems.
Furthermore, a defining characteristic of weak fiscal states is that they are unable
to gather large tax amounts from traditional elite groups (see Section 1). The ability
of governments to tax the assets, earnings, and savings of wealthy citizens is signif-
icantly higher in rich states: the average share of direct taxes for G7 countries, 0.76,
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is nearly three times that of the seven least productive sample countries, 0.26.16 The
share of direct taxes is thus a key feature that distinguishes powerful fiscal states from
weak ones.
As an alternative, we use a catch-all measure of fiscal capacity, the ratio of total tax
revenues to GDP. Row 4 reports the descriptive statistics for this variable.
3.2 OLS Regressions
Table 2 presents ordinary least-squares (OLS) regressions of log output per worker
against fiscal capacity for various specifications. The linear regressions are for the
equation
log(Yi/Li) = α+ βFi + γ′Xi + ei, (1)
where Yi/Li is output per worker in country i, Fi is fiscal capacity, Xi is a set of controls,
and ei is a random error term. We use the natural logarithm of worker productivity,
since there is no theoretical motivation to favor levels over logs, and because logs facil-
itate the interpretation of our results. The use of productivity levels as the dependent
variable, however, did not alter the findings in any significant way. Throughout our
investigation, the coefficient of interest is β, the effect of fiscal capacity on output per
worker. We always include continental dummies for Africa, Asia, and Latin America
according to Persson and Tabellini (2003, ch. 3).
Column 1 indicates that there is a significant positive correlation between direct
tax shares, our key measure of fiscal capacity, and GDP per worker. Figure 1 depicts
this relationship graphically. To provide a sense of the magnitude of the impact of fis-
cal capacity on performance, we compare Chad, which falls in roughly the 25th per-
centile of the direct tax share measure, 0.30, with South Korea, which falls in roughly
the 50th percentile, 0.46. The column 1 estimate, 3.83, indicates that GDP per worker
for South Korea should be nearly twice as large as that for Chad. In reality, this out-
put gap is roughly 14-fold, which means that, if the impact estimated in Table 2 was
causal, then the effect of fiscal capacity on productivity would be substantial, but still
notably less than the true Chad-South Korean output difference.17
16The G7 countries are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. The seven least productive are Bhutan, Burundi, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Madagascar, Myanmar, and Rwanda.
17Naturally, a variety of factors beyond fiscal capacity also influence performance (e.g., Hall and Jones,
1999).
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Climate is often thought to directly affect productivity. To control for this factor, we
include absolute latitude as a regressor in column 2. The coefficient on fiscal capacity
falls, but only slightly. Latitude is also significant, and has the positive sign suggested
by past work. The inclusion of a squared latitude term does not significantly alter
these results.18 Finally, note that the continental dummies capture broad geographical
factors beyond climate.
Theory predicts that political inclusiveness influences government size and hence
fiscal capacity (Persson and Tabellini, 2000). Column 3 includes a measure of democ-
racy, and column 4 a measure of government size.19 The findings are similar in mag-
nitude and significance to those in column 2. Democracy has a positive significant
performance effect, while the effect for government size is negative but not signifi-
cant.
Trade openness implies that indirect tax revenues from tariffs will be low. Ce-
teris paribus, revenues from direct tax sources should thus be higher. Free trade may
also have a positive income effect, increasing overall tax revenues. For these reasons,
openness may affect direct tax shares, our main fiscal capacity measure. To control for
trade impacts, column 5 includes a measure of openness.20 Our results remain similar
as before. Trade has a significant positive productivity effect.
Column 6 adds the variables for latitude, political inclusiveness, government size,
and trade openness simultaneously. The findings for fiscal capacity are unaltered.
Now government size has a significant negative performance impact, while the im-
pact for democracy remains positive but is no longer significant. The trade effect
remains positive and significant.
Column 7, which restricts the sample to non-OECD countries, indicates that rich
countries do not drive our results. By contrast, the magnitude of the coefficient on
fiscal capacity falls notably (although it is still significant) when using OECD coun-
tries alone. This finding concurs with the literature on weak fiscal states which argues
that underinvestment in basic public services primarily occurs in emerging economies
(see Section 1). Once countries reach a certain development threshold, such as the
shift from non-OECD to OECD status, the importance of further fiscal improvements
18As an alternative, we used a dummy variable for tropical countries. The key result was unchanged.
19Due to the lack of a plausible instrument, we treat democracy as exogenous. However, we were able to
treat government size as endogenous and use distance to major exporters and population as instruments
according to Rodrik (1998). Our main estimate was unaffected.
20We also treated trade openness as endogenous and used the instrument from Frankel and Romer (1999).
The key result was unaltered.
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appears to diminish.21
Column 8 repeats our baseline regressions using the ratio of total taxes to GDP as
an alternative measure of fiscal capacity, and column 9 replaces our dependent vari-
able, GDP per worker, with the TFP measure from Hall and Jones (1999). In each case,
the effect of fiscal capacity on economic performance remains positive and highly sig-
nificant.
In total, the Table 2 findings display a strong correlation between our measures
of fiscal capacity and worker productivity. There are two key reasons, however, why
we should not interpret this relationship as causal. To start, there is a problem of
reverse casuality: wealthy economies may choose, or at least may afford, stronger
fiscal systems. Second, there are omitted factors that affect both fiscal institutions
and economic performance. We would expect these problems to positively bias the
OLS estimates. On the other hand, if our capacity measures are noisy, and do not
correspond well with the greater cluster of economic and political institutions that in-
fluence actual productivity levels, then there may be a negative attenuation bias to the
OLS estimates. To address these problems, we need a plausible instrument for fiscal
capacity. Our instrument must account in a significant way for the observed varia-
tion in fiscal institutions, but have no direct impact on productivity. As described in
Sections 1 and 2, we claim that casualties sustained in pre-modern wars are plausible
instruments.
4 Pre-Modern War Casualties
To wage bigger wars, historical states required greater revenues, and thus more fiscal
innovations. A key issue is how to measure past conflicts. By treating all conflicts
as equally sized, the use of binary indicators to compute the share of years that a
sample country fought external conflicts masks large differences in war magnitudes.
Comprehensive historical data for fiscal variables such as military expenditures or
21Although a recent literature argues that higher taxes in Western Europe help account for the shortfall
in GDP per worker relative to the United States (Prescott, 2004, Ohanian et al., 2008), our results do not
reveal any negative productivity effects of greater overall fiscal capacity. When fiscal capacity is high (e.g.,
at OECD-country levels), however, there is reason to think that different tax compositions may influence
productivity levels. For instance, Hines and Summers (2009) argue that the forces of globalization are likely
to lead to an increase in consumption-style taxes in rich countries like the United States.
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government debts, moreover, are not available.22
War casualties are one unique source of information that provide a succinct, com-
parable measure of the magnitude of past conflicts. Our data are from Clodfelter
(2002), whose statistical compendium is a comprehensive historical source for armed
conflicts. The nineteenth-century data span Western and Eastern Europe, North and
Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia, the British Indian Empire, East
and Southeast Asia and Oceania, the United States and Canada, the Caribbean, and
South America. To form our benchmark instrument, we computed the number of to-
tal casualties sustained by state armed forces in major external conflicts listed as wars,
wars of independence, conquests, and campaigns from 1816 to 1913 for each sample
country.23 Table 3 displays the names, years, participants, and coalitions of these con-
flicts, of which there are 141, by geographical category. We describe key aspects of
this database throughout this section. The Data Appendix provides further details.
Our 2SLS regressions rely upon the exclusion restriction that, conditional on the
included controls, casualties sustained in historical conflicts have no effect on current
economic performance other than their impact on fiscal systems. We argue that our
exclusion restriction is plausible for the following reasons. First and foremost, eco-
nomic historians claim that greater fiscal capacity was the key long-run institutional
change brought about by historical wars (see Section 2). Furthermore, the cut-off year
for our benchmark instrument, 1913, is before World War I (1914-18), when enormous
casuality totals signaled the onset of the era of mass modern warfare and weapons of
mass destruction. Our instrument thus concerns wars from the “pre-modern” mili-
tary age. In Clodfelter’s (2002, p. 479) words:
The count of casualties took a quantum leap in the Great War. Battle losses
of World War I were totally unprecedented in human history. Even the
greatest battles of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Europe . . . paled
besides those of World War I when counting numbers engaged and fallen.
22There is also a conceptual reason to focus on state revenues rather than debts. The historical literature
indicates that the state’s ability to borrow wartime funds was typically an outcome of, but not a substitute
for, its capacity to raise new taxes and thereby repay interest on loans. For instance, O’Brien (2011a, p. 430)
argues that England’s status as the dominant fiscal state enabled it to accumulate very large war-related
debts over the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries.
23The fact that there were fewer European-based wars over the 1816-1913 period (called “Pax Britannica”)
relative to previous eras (e.g., the tumultuous eighteenth century prior to 1789, or the French Revolutionary
and Napoleonic Wars from 1792 to 1815) should reduce the impact of European warfare on our results. Also
see Section 6.
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In addition, the 1913 cut-off is well before the post-1945 boom in social spending
that established far-reaching government bureaucracies. Lindert (2004) argues that
military expenditures dominated state budgets through the start of the twentieth cen-
tury, and that there was little spending on social programs of any kind. New funds
generated by wartime fiscal innovations were often put toward greater defense expen-
ditures. Moreover, the large-scale participation of women in the work force brought
about by warfare (e.g., “Rosie the Riveter” during World War II) was a post-1913 phe-
nomenon. It is thus unlikely that pre-modern wars influenced female labor market
participation. Our IV analysis also controls for a large set of non-fiscal factors that
may be correlated with pre-modern war casualties and current economic outcomes.
To further improve the plausibility of our IV approach, we used Clodfelter (2002)
to compile an alternative database for an even earlier era. These data cover all major
external conflicts from 1700 to 1788, the year prior to the French Revolution which
marked the end of the Ancien Re´gime.24 The key disadvantage of the eighteenth-
century database is that it is less expansive. While Clodfelter documents external
conflicts for 11 geographical designations from 1816 to 1913, there are only six such
designations for the 1700s. However, the eighteenth-century data are useful as a ro-
bustness check since they are set farther back in history and are thus even less likely
to have any direct effect on current economic performance.
As an additional check, we constructed a third instrument for the number of total
battle-related deaths sustained by state armed forces in major external conflicts fought
in Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, Oceania, and the Western Hemisphere from
1816 to 1913 from the Correlates of War (COW) database of Sarkees (2000). While this
data source is valuable, the Clodfelter (2002) data better fit the particular demands of
our analysis. Since it starts in 1816, we cannot use the COW database to document
eighteenth-century wars. For the 1816-1913 period, the Clodfelter data include 141
wars in total, while the COW database only includes 114, a difference of nearly 30.
Finally, unlike the COW database, Clodfelter’s individual war summary descriptions
allow us to account for some modern states by way of historical predecessors. The
Data Appendix describes these details. For instance, we counted casualties in wars
fought by the Gurkha Kingdom for Nepal and those in wars fought by the Kandy
Kingdom of Ceylon for Sri Lanka. The Clodfelter data thus enable us to develop a
24To reduce the effect of European warfare on our findings, we exclude the French Revolutionary and
Napoleonic Wars (1792-1815).
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more comprehensive set of pre-modern wars than the COW data in these regards.
However, the COW data are still useful as a robustness check.
Comprehensive historical data for country size are not available. To account for
size differences, we scaled the war casualty figures by square kilometers of current
territory. Many sample countries were characterized by relatively stable borders from
the nineteenth century onwards. Most other sample countries only experienced small
net changes in physical size. Scaling by area is thus far more accurate than scaling by
population, which experienced significant fluctuations over time, in some cases as a
result of warfare. Furthermore, there is a dearth of yearly country-level population
data prior to World War II. We claim that scaling by area is much better than scaling
by population for these reasons. To explicitly account for country size, we always
include area as an additional regressor in the 2SLS regressions. Finally, we recognize
the concern that arises if we do not take past population density into account, since
past density may be linked with past economic success, which gave rise to both larger
historical wars and higher current incomes. We control for past population density
(and past economic success more generally) in Section 6.
Table 4 displays the summary statistics for the pre-modern war casualty data. Ex-
ternal conflicts led to an average of 0.10 total casualties per square kilometer of terri-
tory from 1816 to 1913. Bulgaria experienced the most (scaled) casualties, at 1.51 per
square kilometer. Relatively more wars were fought during the eighteenth century.
External conflicts led to an average of 0.20 total casualties per square kilometer of ter-
ritory from 1700 to 1788. The Netherlands experienced the most (scaled) casualties,
at 3.36 per square kilometer, over this era. Finally, according to the COW database,
which measures total battle-related deaths, the 1816-1913 average was lower than the
Clodfelter one, at 0.06 military deaths per square kilometer. Here Slovenia experi-
enced the most (scaled) casualties, at 1.06 per square kilometer.
War patterns beyond casualty totals may also matter. Participation in one large
conflict per era could have had different fiscal implications than participation in sev-
eral small conflicts, even if the total number of casualties was similar across both
cases. Furthermore, countries that participated in more conflicts could have benefited
from “learning by doing,” which would imply that casualties fell with greater war
experience, even if fiscal capacity grew. The level of substitutability between soldiers
and weaponry could have also been important, since a smaller force with skilled per-
sonnel or advanced technology could have been more effective than a large but badly
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equipped one, influencing war casualties and fiscal requirements alike. Finally, win-
ning or losing conflicts could have had diverse effects on war casualties and public
finances.
To control for war patterns, we computed both the total number of wars and the
total years at war for each sample country from 1816 to 1913. Since some countries
fought multiple conflicts per year, total war years could exceed 97 (i.e., 1913 minus
1816). Table 4 indicates that sample countries participated in an average of 3.57 wars
over this period, with an average of 15 years at war. The United Kingdom fought
the most external conflicts, at 43, and during the most years, at 121. The UK also
experienced very large casualties in both scaled (0.60) and absolute (146,254) terms
and was the world’s most dominant fiscal state (Brewer, 1989, O’Brien, 2011a). Fur-
thermore, there are strong positive relationships between the number and length of
wars, casualties, and fiscal strength for the four other historical Great Powers.25 These
correlations are consistent with the leading narrative in the historical literature about
warfare and fiscal strength (see Section 2). They suggest that, although concerns about
learning-by-doing and substitutability between soldiers and weaponry are notewor-
thy, the hypothesized positive relationship between war magnitudes as measured by
casualty totals and past fiscal innovations will hold.
Conflict type is another war characteristic that we must consider. Recall that our
benchmark instrument includes wars, wars of independence, conquests, and cam-
paigns. Independence wars could be of particular concern, since the 1816-1913 period
includes the establishment of new nations in Latin America and elsewhere. Nascent
states often had large debt levels after independence wars, which could have had
negative development effects due to the sheer amounts to be repaid and the poten-
tially onerous repayment terms themselves. Furthermore, war casualties could be
endogenous, since past institutional structures and income levels not only affected
the occurrence and magnitude of independence wars (and thus the casualty numbers
themselves), but could also impact current performance levels. There could also be
a selection problem, since the outcomes of independence wars determined whether
new nations were formed. When independence movements were defeated, conflicts
could be counted as civil disputes and potentially excluded from our sample set. If
25These were the Austrian Empire, France, Prussia, Russia, and the United Kingdom. France was ranked
either first, second, or third among sample countries in the number (16) and years (96) of wars and scaled
(1.50) and absolute (792,436) casualties. Russia was ranked in the top deciles for three of these categories
and Prussia for two. Austria was ranked in the top one-third for all four categories.
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only relatively powerful “states to be” won independence wars, then there would be a
positive bias to the impact of war casualties on fiscal capacity. Finally, the cumulative
fiscal effects of conflicts on colonizers like Spain, who lost their American possessions
in rapid succession over the nineteenth century, could have been stronger than other
conflict types with similar numbers of total casualties.
As a proxy for the impact of independence wars, we computed their share in total
wars from 1816 to 1913. Table 4 indicates that independence wars comprised just 5
percent of all sample conflicts. This statistic suggests that concerns about indepen-
dence wars, although valid, should not significantly alter the results of our IV analy-
sis.
A related issue is nineteenth-century European colonization in Africa, Asia, and
the Middle East, which could have had long-run fiscal and economic implications.26
Following Clodfelter (2002), we use different geographical categories to distinguish
between wars fought between European states on the European continent itself and
wars fought between Europeans or with native states on other continents (see Table
3). For instance, the Crimean War (1853-6) in which France, the United Kingdom,
and others fought Russia was classified under Western Europe, while the Arrow War
(1856-60) in which France and the UK fought China was classified under East Asia.
We counted casualty figures for native soldiers in the colonial armed forces for the Eu-
ropean state for which they served according to Clodfelter’s summary descriptions.
For instance, since sepoys were Indian soldiers that fought in the British armed forces,
any sepoy casualties were included in the totals for the United Kingdom. Casualties
for armed forces like the native Maratha Empire, by contrast, were included in the
totals for India.
To control for the impact of colonization, we computed the share of colonial wars
in total wars from 1816 to 1913. Table 4 indicates that colonial wars comprised 21
percent of all sample conflicts. Since this share is notable, our 2SLS analysis also
explicitly accounts for colonial origins.
26According to O’Brien (2011a, pp. 415-16), the role of colonial revenues in the development of European
fiscal systems was negligible. He argues that, after accounting for conquest costs and annual outlays for
defense and governance, net flows of colonial tributes into state coffers were typically small or negative.
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5 Capacity and Performance: IV Results
Table 5 shows the results of the two-stage least-squares (2SLS) estimates of equation
1. We treat the fiscal capacity variable, Fi, as endogenous, and model the equation
Fi = λ+ ζWi + δ′Xi + νi, (2)
where Wi is casualties sustained in pre-modern wars per square kilometer of territory.
The exclusion restriction is that Wi does not appear in equation 1. Recall from Section 4
that, since we scale our instrument by area, all 2SLS specifications include this variable
as a control.27 We again include continental dummies in all specifications as part of
the controls Xi.
Panel A presents the 2SLS estimates for β, our coefficient of interest from equation
1, Panel B the corresponding first stages, and Panel C the corresponding OLS esti-
mates for β.28 Column 1 shows the strong first-stage relationship between pre-modern
war casualties and current fiscal institutions.29 The corresponding 2SLS estimate of
the effect of fiscal capacity on GDP per worker is 4.98. This impact is significant at the
1 percent level. It is also larger than the OLS estimates, which suggests that negative
attenuation bias may be more relevant than positive biases from reverse casuality and
omitted variables.30 It is difficult to disentangle the cluster of economic and political
institutions that influence actual productivity levels, and any one measure will only
account for part of the total effect of the clustering of relevant institutions. It thus ap-
pears that the noisiness of our fiscal capacity variable generates a standard problem
of measurement error.
To see whether the magnitude of our 2SLS estimate is sensible, we revisit our com-
parison of two countries with low and medium fiscal capacities, Chad and South Ko-
rea. The 2SLS estimate, 4.98, indicates that raising Chad’s fiscal capacity to the level
of South Korea would increase Chad’s worker productivity by 123 percent. Overall,
27This variable is typically not significant.
28We also re-ran the 2SLS regressions with standard errors clustered in several ways. To account for the
possibility that countries that were located near each other were more likely to fight, we clustered by world
regions. As an alternative scheme, we clustered by the frequency of war partners according to Table 3. As
a third alternative, we clustered by colonial relationships. None of these clustering schemes altered the key
results.
29We report the results of Angrist-Pischke multivariate F-tests at the bottom of Panel B. This diagnostic,
which tests for weak instruments, indicates that our instrument is generally strong across specifications.
30For consistency with the 2SLS regressions, the OLS regressions include area as a control here. The
coefficient values thus differ slightly from those shown in Table 2.
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the Table 5 estimates suggest a large, but not improbable, impact of fiscal capacity on
productivity.
Column 2 shows that adding latitude in the baseline regression does not alter the
positive and significant relationship between fiscal capacity and productivity. As for
Table 2, the coefficient on fiscal capacity falls, but only slightly. Latitude is also sig-
nificant. Including a squared latitude term does not significantly alter these results.
Column 3 includes the political inclusiveness variable, column 4 government size,
and column 5 trade openness.31 Column 6 adds the variables for latitude, political
inclusiveness, government size, and trade openness simultaneously. The findings for
fiscal capacity are unaltered. Column 7 repeats our baseline specification for our al-
ternative measure of fiscal capacity, the ratio of total taxes to GDP, and column 8 for
our alternative measure of performance, TFP. The magnitudes and significance of the
results for each of these specifications resemble our baseline case.
Table 6 employs our alternative instruments and related controls. Column 1 adds
the variables for the total number of wars and the total years at war to our baseline
specification. The effect of fiscal capacity remains similar as before. Column 2 includes
the shares of independence wars and colonial wars, respectively. The results for fiscal
capacity are again unchanged. Column 3 adds the variables for total wars, war years,
and independence and colonial war shares simultaneously. The findings for fiscal
capacity are unaltered. Column 4 uses the Clodfelter casualty data from 1700 to 1788.
The coefficient values for fiscal capacity are larger than our baseline case. Column 5
uses the battle-related death figures for 1816 to 1913 from the COW database. Here
the β coefficient rises even further.32
In total, the 2SLS results indicate a substantial impact of fiscal institutions on in-
come per worker. The next section examines the robustness of these findings.
31We were also able to treat government size and trade openness as endogenous and instrument for them
here. Our key estimates were unaffected. See Section 3 for further details.
32However, the first-stage relationship between pre-modern wars and current fiscal institutions is only





Whether the 2SLS findings in Tables 4 and 5 are valid depends on the assumption that
casualties sustained in pre-modern wars have no direct impact on current worker
productivity. Although we argue that this assumption is plausible for the reasons
described in Section 4, we now test it further by controlling for other possible vari-
ables that may be correlated with both past wars and current economic outcomes,
and checking whether the inclusion of these variables affects our estimates. While
this exercise cannot totally rule out endogeneity concerns, we find that the key results
are robust to the new controls.
Mokyr (1998, 1999) argues that the Industrial Revolution took place in two phases,
first in Britain from 1760 to 1830 and second on the European continent and North
America from 1870 to 1913. It may be that technological improvements and greater
wages during industrialization gave rise to larger militaries (and thus bigger past
wars and casualties) and higher current income alike. Column 1 of Table 7 excludes
the five historical Great Powers. The key finding for fiscal capacity remains robust.33
To further account for past technology and wealth, we use four alternative con-
trols. Comin et al. (2010) emphasize technology adoption levels in 1500, prior to
European contact and colonization. Column 2 includes the 1500 technology adop-
tion measure in the baseline specification. The impact of fiscal capacity is unchanged.
Similarly, Bockstette et al. (2002), Chanda and Putterman (2007), and Putterman and
Weil (2010) argue that a long history of statehood and an early transition to agriculture
have a significant influence on income today. Column 3 controls for state antiquity,
and column 4 for agricultural transitions. The findings for fiscal capacity are again
similar.
As a fourth alternative, we use past population density from the HYDE database of
Klein Goldewijk et al. (2010). Given the dearth of country-level income data prior to
World War II, we prefer this measure to historical GDP levels. Past population density
also enables us to account for the Malthusian phenomenon that, in densely populated
places, technologies were more advanced or land was more productive (Galor and
33When excluding all 19 OECD countries, the relationship between pre-modern wars and current fiscal
institutions is positive, but not significant (the p-value is 0.13). However, re-running this specification
without continental dummies, or replacing these dummies with controls for colonial origins, makes this
relationship highly significant.
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Weil, 1999, 2000, Ashraf and Galor, 2011), which may have affected the likelihood of
warfare. Our variable for early population density is for 1820, just after the start of
the sample period for our war casualty instrument. To measure density, we computed
the number of inhabitants per square kilometer across eight world regions. Column
5 adds this variable. The finding for fiscal capacity remains unchanged. These results
also hold if we use population density measures for eras farther back in time (i.e.,
1500, 1600, and 1700). Overall, the findings in columns 1 to 5 indicate that past wealth
and technology levels do not drive the main results.
La Porta et al. (1998) emphasize the importance of legal origins as a determinant of
current institutional environments. Column 6 controls for English, German, Scandi-
navian, and Socialist legal origins, where the default group consists of countries with
French legal origins. Once more, there is little impact on our key estimate.
Colonial history is another potential determinant of current institutions (Acemoglu
et al., 2001). Column 7 controls for British, Spanish or Portuguese, and other colonial
origins, where the default group consists of countries that were never colonies. The
main result for fiscal capacity is unaltered.34
Many theories including Max Weber’s “Protestant Ethic” claim that religion is
an important economic determinant. Column 8 includes the population shares of
Catholics and Protestants, also from La Porta et al. (1998). In column 9, we control
for ethnic and linguistic fractionalization according to Alesina et al. (2002). Our key
estimate remains highly significant in both cases.
Guiso et al. (2009) argue that countries with a long history of wars between them
trust each other less, which in turn has negative effects on bilateral trade and invest-
ment. Many of the controls that we already use (political inclusiveness, trade open-
ness, early technology adoption, state antiquity, agricultural transitions, past popu-
lation density, legal and colonial origins, religion, fractionalization) capture trust as
well as broader cultural effects. However, as an explicit control we construct a vari-
able from the World Value Survey (2009) which measures the level of trust that indi-
viduals have for others. Column 10 adds this variable. Due to data limitations, there
are only 44 observations available. The coefficient on fiscal capacity falls, but remains
34As an alternative, we used the binary variable for historical colonial status from Comin et al. (2010). The
key results did not change. Although it would also be worthwhile to use settler mortality rates from Ace-
moglu et al. (2001) to instrument for current property rights institutions, severe data limitations prevented
this exercise (there are only 36 observations that overlap between Acemoglu et al.’s dataset and ours).
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highly significant.35
Although the addition of new controls cannot completely exclude the possibility
of endogeneity, the key results remain robust. This exercise thus reinforces our claim
that pre-modern war casualties are plausibly exogenous.
6.2 Sensitivity Analysis
To test the plausibility of our exogeneity assumption even further, we now perform a
sensitivity analysis. This analysis evaluates the extent to which our key results regard-
ing the positive performance effect of greater fiscal capacity can withstand violations
of the exclusion restriction. We find that these results are indeed robust to moderate
violations.
Recall from Section 5 that our exclusion restriction is that Wi in equation 2 does not
appear in equation 1. Following Conley et al. (2012), the sensitivity analysis instead
assumes that Wi does in fact appear in equation 1:
log(Yi/Li) = α+ βFi + γ′Xi + ηWi + ei. (3)
To test how much of a violation of the exclusion restriction could exist before the
positive effect of greater fiscal capacity on performance is no longer significant, we
consider the following equation
log(Yi/Li)− ηWi = α+ βFi + γ′Xi + ei, (4)
where we allow η to take values other than zero.
Our inference strategy, which we base on Beber (2009) and Conley et al. (2012),
makes the a priori assumption that η is normally distributed with mean zero and
variance σ2η . We test many values of the standard deviation ση , which we vary sys-
tematically from 0 to 1 at 0.1 intervals. For each ση , we draw 10,000 η values from
N (0, σ2η). The final output generates the percentage of 95-percent confidence inter-
vals for our coefficient of interest β which are always positive.
Table 8 shows the results of the sensitivity analysis. Panel A reproduces the key
findings from the eight 2SLS specifications in Table 5. The first row displays the coef-
ficients for the second-stage relationships of fiscal capacity on economic performance,
35We re-ran our benchmark IV specification using the same 44 observations as for the trust variable.
The 2SLS estimate was 3.39 and is significant. As an alternative, we also constructed another control that
measured the level of trust that individuals have for people of other nationalities (here were only 41 obser-
vations available for this variable). The key results were unchanged.
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and the second row the coefficients for the first-stage relationships of past war casu-
alties on fiscal capacity. Panel B shows the percentage of confidence intervals for β
which are always positive. The first row of this panel replicates the benchmark 2SLS
specification from column 1 of Table 5, where we assume that the exclusion restriction
is met exactly and η = 0. In this case, all confidence intervals for β will always be pos-
itive. The second row increases ση to 0.1. The percentage of confidence intervals for
β which are always positive remains 100 percent of the time for most specifications.
Moreover, for the three specifications for which this percentage falls below 100 (i.e.,
columns, 3, 6, and 8), it is still very high, ranging from 77 to 98 percent of the time.
Although the percentage of confidence intervals for β which are always positive grad-
ually falls as we further increase ση , it always includes the majority (and sometimes,
the vast majority) of specifications. For the case of ση = 1, the percentage of confi-
dence intervals for β which are always positive always exceeds 60 percent of the time,
excluding the three specifications described above. For these cases, this percentage
still occurs the majority of the time.
Summarizing, the sensitivity analysis indicates that our key results are robust to
moderate violations of the exclusion restriction. While we still cannot completely ex-
clude endogeneity concerns, this analysis thus provides further support for the plau-
sibility of our IV approach.
7 Conclusion
A recent literature claims that fiscal capacity plays an important role in economic de-
velopment. Problems of reverse causation and omitted variables, however, make it
difficult to isolate exogenous sources of variation in fiscal institutions in order to esti-
mate their impact on worker productivity. In this paper, we claimed that differences
in pre-modern wars could be used as a possible source of exogenous variation in fiscal
capacities.
We base our argument on three premises. First, states fought different amounts
of external wars, of various lengths and magnitudes. Second, to raise the revenues
to wage pre-modern wars, states made fiscal innovations. Economic historians claim
that greater fiscal capacity was the key long-run institutional change brought about
by historical wars. Third, the impact of past innovations on fiscal systems persisted
to the present. Since past wars impact current fiscal institutions, we exploit these
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differences as a plausible source of exogenous variation to isolate the impact of fiscal
capacity on worker productivity.
Our empirical analysis indicates that there is a strong positive correlation between
pre-modern war casualties and current fiscal institutions. Using this source of varia-
tion, we estimate substantial effects of fiscal capacity on GDP per worker. We show
that our findings are robust to a broad range of specifications, controls, and sub-
samples.
Since casualties sustained in pre-modern wars are arguably exogenous, they make
for plausible instruments to estimate the impact of fiscal capacity on worker produc-
tivity. However, the results do not suggest that current fiscal institutions are pre-
destined by pre-modern conflicts and cannot be changed. Our interpretation of the
findings is that improvements in fiscal capacity may lead to large economic returns,
such as the experiences of the Asian Tiger nations from the 1960s onwards.
Our results indicate that strengthening fiscal institutions would lead to substan-
tial gains in worker productivity, but they do not reveal the precise mechanisms by
which such improvements would occur. Some economic historians argue that the
state was an active participant in the development of modern capitalist systems (e.g.,
Gerschenkron, 1966, Magnusson, 2009, Cardoso and Lains, 2010a). For instance, Mag-
nusson (2009) highlights the role of state-funded systems of higher education in sci-
ence (e.g., institutes of technology) in the industrialization process. A systematic
investigation of the specific channels through which greater fiscal capacity impacts
long-run economic performance is a key area for future research.
Data Appendix
The database and do-file will be available for future download from the correspond-
ing author’s website.
A War Casualties
Casualties Sustained in Pre-Modern Wars: Our main variable for pre-modern conflicts
is the number of total casualties sustained by state armed forces in major external
conflicts listed as wars, wars of independence, conquests, and campaigns from 1816
to 1913. The term “casualty” refers to all persons lost to active military service, in-
24
cluding those killed in action or by disease, disabled by physical or mental injuries,
captured, deserted, or missing. In rare cases, data limitations imply that our figures
refer to soldiers killed or wounded in battle as well as deaths by disease rather than
to casualties per se. Likewise, in rare cases casualty figures were not available for all
war participants.
We accounted for some modern states by way of external conflicts fought by his-
torical predecessors based on individual war summary descriptions. For Europe,
pre-unitary German (e.g., the Kingdom of Prussia) and Italian (e.g., the Kingdom of
Sardinia-Piedmont) states were counted for Germany and Italy, respectively. Casu-
alty totals for the Austrian (and later, the Austro-Hungarian) Empire, which we label
“Austria” in Table 3, were split equally between its member states.36 For Africa, we
counted the Arab Empire of the Eastern Congo for the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, the Mandingo Empire (including casualty totals for tribesman that Clodfelter
labels Papel, Fulani, and Beafadi) for Guinea, the Merina Kingdom (whose tribesman
Clodfelter labels as Hova) for Madagascar, the Zulu Kingdom (including casualty to-
tals for soldiers that Clodfelter labels Bantu or Xhosa) and, later, the Boer colony for
South Africa, and the Ndebele Kingdom for Zimbabwe. For the Middle East and Cen-
tral Asia, we counted Persia for Iran. For the British Indian Empire, we counted the
Maratha Empire for India, the Gurkha Kingdom for Nepal, the Sindhi and Pathan
tribes for Pakistan, and the Kandy Kingdom of Ceylon for Sri Lanka. Casualty totals
for the Sikh Empire of the Punjab region were split equally between India and Pak-
istan. For East and Southeast Asia and Oceania, we counted the Aceh Kingdom of
Sumatra, Bali, Java, and Lombok for Indonesia and Burma for Myanmar. Casualty
totals for the Kashgarian tribes were split equally between Kazahkistan, Tajikistan,
Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan (due to a lack of fiscal data, the last three
entities were excluded as sample countries). For North America, we counted Texas
and any other territories that later became U.S. states for the United States. Casualty
figures for native soldiers in the colonial armed forces were counted for the Euro-
pean state for which they served according to the summary descriptions. Section 4
provides an example. To account for country size, we scaled this variable by area in
square kilometers. Source: Clodfelter (2002).
36These were Austria, Belarus, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania, the Slovak
Republic, Slovenia, Ukraine, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia (due to a lack of fiscal data, the last
two entities were excluded as sample countries). Counting the casualty totals exclusively for Austria, or
splitting them evenly with Hungary, the other modern state most closely associated with the Empire, did
not alter the main results of the 2SLS regressions in any significant way.
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The first alternative variable resembles the main variable for pre-modern conflicts,
except that it covers the period from 1700 to 1788. Based on the summary description
from Clodfelter (2002), we counted the Jesuit Reductions for Paraguay. To account for
country size, we scaled this variable by area in square kilometers. Source: Clodfelter
(2002).
The second alternative for pre-modern conflicts is the number of total battle-related
deaths sustained by state armed forces in inter-state or extra-state wars from 1816 to
1913. Once more, pre-unitary German and Italian states were counted for Germany
and Italy, and the Austrian Empire was counted for its member states. To account for
country size, we scaled this variable by area in square kilometers. Source: Correlates
of War Database of Sarkees (2000), Version 3.0.
Total Number of Wars: Total number of wars fought from 1816 to 1913. Source: Clod-
felter (2002).
Total Years at War: Total years at war fought from 1816 to 1913. Source: Clodfelter
(2002).
Share of Independence Wars: Share of independence wars in total external conflicts from
1816 to 1913, where independence wars were labeled as such. Source: Clodfelter
(2002).
Share of Colonial Wars: Share of colonial wars in total external conflicts from 1816 to
1913, where colonial wars were fought by Western and Central European countries in
Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Source: Clodfelter (2002).
B Regression Variables
Log GDP per Worker: Natural logarithm of real gross domestic product per worker in
constant dollars (chain index) expressed in international prices, base year 2000. We
average this variable from 1990 to 2000. We dropped countries with populations of
500,000 or less from our sample. Source: Penn World Tables of Heston et al. (2006),
Version 6.2.
TFP: Total factor productivity relative to that of the United States in 1988. Source: Hall
and Jones (1999).
Share of Direct Taxes: Share of total tax revenues from direct taxes, where direct taxes
are the sum of income taxes, social security taxes, payroll taxes, and property taxes
divided by total tax revenues. We average this variable from 1990 to 2000. Source:
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Government Financial Statistics database of the IMF.
Total Taxes to GDP: Total tax revenues divided by GDP in current prices. We average
this variable from 1990 to 2000. Source: Government Financial Statistics database of
the IMF.
Continental Indicators: The dummy for Africa equals one for sample countries located
in Africa. The dummy for Asia equals one for sample countries located in East and
Southeast Asia (Japan is counted as an OECD country). The dummy for Latin Amer-
ica equals one for sample countries located in Latin America (Central and South
America plus Mexico). Sources: Persson and Tabellini (2003), CIA World Factbook
(2009).
Latitude: Absolute value of the distance from the equator, ranging from 0 to 90 degrees.
We rescaled this variable to take values between 0 and 1. Source: CIA World Factbook
(2009).
Democracy: A country is democratic so long as the variable polity2 has a strictly posi-
tive value. We average this variable from 1990 to 2000. Source: Polity IV Database of
Jaggers and Marshall (2008).
Government Size: Government share of real gross domestic product in constant dol-
lars (chain index) expressed in international prices, base year 2000. We average this
variable from 1990 to 2000. Source: Penn World Tables of Heston et al. (2006), Version
6.2.
Trade Openness: Sum of export and import shares in GDP, averaged from 1990 to 2000.
Source: World Development Indicators of the World Bank (2011).
OECD Indicators: The OECD dummy equals one for sample countries that were OECD
members prior to 1993 (Turkey is not counted as an OECD country). Source: Persson
and Tabellini (2003).
Area: Physical size measured in millions of square kilometers. Source: CIA World
Factbook (2009).
Great Powers Indicators: The Great Powers dummy equals one for sample countries
that were historical Great Powers: the Austrian Empire (counted as Austria and Hun-
gary), France, Prussia (counted as Germany), Russia, and the United Kingdom. Source:
Ferguson (2006).
Technological Adoption in 1500: Average of sectoral technology adoption indexes in
1500 and adjusted for post-1500 migration. Source: Comin et al. (2010).
State Antiquity: Index that measures the presence of a supra-tribal polity within present-
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day country boundaries from 1 to 1950 at 50-year intervals, using a five percent dis-
count rate and scaled between 0 to 50. Source: Putterman (2007).
Agricultural Transitions: Index that measures the number of years since 2000 that the
first major region within a given present-day country made the transition from a for-
aging to an agricultural society, scaled by millenia. Source: Putterman (2006).
Population Density in 1820: Populations of Africa, Asia, the former Soviet Union, Mid-
dle East, Europe, Latin America, North America, and Oceania in 1820 (1500, 1600,
1700) divided by area in square kilometers. Source: HYDE Database of Klein Gold-
ewijk et al. (2010).
Legal Origins Indicators: The dummy for English legal origins equals one for sample
countries with English legal origins. Similar classifications are used for countries with
German, Scandinavian, or Socialist origins. Countries with French legal origins com-
prise the default group. Source: La Porta et al. (1998).
Colonial Origins Indicators: The dummy for British colonial origins equals one for sam-
ple countries that are former colonies of the United Kingdom. The dummy for Span-
ish or Portuguese colonial origins equals one for countries that are former colonies of
Spain or Portugal. The dummy for other colonial origins equals one for countries that
are former colonies of countries other than the UK, Spain, or Portugal. Countries that
were never colonies comprise the default group. Source: Persson and Tabellini (2003).
Religion: Percentage of the population professing the Catholic or Protestant religion
in 1980. Source: La Porta et al. (1998).
Ethnic Fractionalization: One minus the Herfindahl index of ethnolinguistic group
shares in 2001. This variable takes higher values for more fractionalized countries.
Source: Alesina et al. (2002).
Trust in Others: Country-level average of individual answers to the question, “Would
you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing
with people?” Respondents chose from three options, “don’t know” (equal to -1),
“most people can be trusted” (equal to 1), or “need to be very careful” (equal to 2).
Source: World Values Survey (2009), Wave 2005-7.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GDP per Worker 96 20,667 16,733 366 64,619
Total Factor Productivity 72 0.59 0.30 0.08 1.21
Direct Tax Share 96 0.47 0.17 0.14 0.95
Total Taxes to GDP 87 0.21 0.10 0.01 0.42
Africa 96 0.18 0.38 0 1
Asia 96 0.05 0.22 0 1
Latin America 96 0.19 0.39 0 1
Latitude 96 0.35 0.20 0.00 0.71
OECD 96 0.20 0.40 0 1
Democracy 95 0.72 0.41 0 1
Government Size 96 0.22 0.09 0.04 0.58
Trade Openness 96 0.77 0.44 0.03 3.33
Area (Millions) 96 1.00 2.47 0.0007 17.1
Great Powers 96 0.06 0.24 0 1
Technological Adoption in 1500 75 0.68 0.24 0.17 1.00
State Antiquity 91 433 210 48.8 818
Agricultural Transitions 96 5,044 2,414 362 10,500
Population Density in 1820 96 12.7 12.3 0.10 33.1
English Legal Origins 96 0.24 0.43 0 1
French Legal Origins 96 0.44 0.50 0 1
German Legal Origins 96 0.05 0.22 0 1
Scandinavian Legal Origins 96 0.04 0.20 0 1
Socialist Legal Origins 96 0.23 0.42 0 1
British Colonial Origins 96 0.22 0.42 0 1
Spanish or Portuguese Colonial Origins 96 0.16 0.36 0 1
Other Colonial Origins 96 0.34 0.48 0 1
Catholic Share 96 0.35 0.38 0 0.97
Protestant Share 96 0.13 0.23 0 0.98
Fractionalization 86 0.28 0.26 0 0.87
Trust in People 44 0.26 0.17 0.04 0.74
Sources: See Data Appendix.
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Table 2: OLS Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
log Y/L log Y/L log Y/L log Y/L log Y/L log Y/L log Y/L log Y/L TFP
Direct Tax Share 3.83∗∗∗ 3.35∗∗∗ 3.61∗∗∗ 3.56∗∗∗ 3.88∗∗∗ 3.01∗∗∗ 3.02∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗
(0.49) (0.45) (0.45) (0.65) (0.46) (0.47) (0.61) (0.15)






Government Size −1.50 −2.15∗∗
(1.26) (0.88)
Trade Openness 0.59∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.17)
Other Controls No OECD
Continents Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.46 0.50 0.50 0.47 0.51 0.59 0.29 0.33 0.38
Number of Observations 96 96 95 96 96 95 77 87 72
***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3: External Conflicts, 1816-1913
Conflict Years Participants and Coalitions
Western Europe
1 Belgian War of Independence 1830-3 Belgium vs. Netherlands
2 First Schleswig-Holstein War 1848-9 Denmark vs. Germany
3 Austro-Sardinian War 1848-9 Austria vs. Italy
4 Crimean War 1853-6 France, Italy, Turkey, UK vs. Russia
5 Franco-Austrian War 1859 Austria vs. France, Italy
6 Second Schleswig-Holstein War 1864 Austria, Germany vs. Denmark
7 Austro-Prussian War 1866 Austria vs. Germany, Italy
Eastern Europe
8 Greek War of Independence 1821-9 Algeria, Egypt, Turkey vs. France, Greece,
Russia, UK
9 First Russo-Turkish War 1828-9 Russia vs. Turkey
10 Turkish-Montenegran Wars 1852-3 Montenegro vs. Turkey
11 – 1858-9 –
12 – 1861 –
13 – 1876 –
14 – 1877 –
15 Second Russo-Turkish War 1877-8 Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey vs. Russia
16 Austrian Conquest of Bosnia 1878 Austria vs. Bosnia
17 Serbo-Bulgarian War 1885 Bulgaria vs. Serbia
18 Greek-Turkish War 1897 Greece vs. Turkey
19 First Balkan War 1912-13 Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, Serbia vs. Turkey
20 Second Balkan War 1913 Bulgaria vs. Greece, Montenegro, Serbia,
Romania, Turkey
North Africa
21 French Conquest of Algeria 1830-47 Algeria vs. France
22 Spanish-Moroccan War 1859-60 Spain vs. Morocco
23 British-Abyssinian War 1867-8 Ethiopia vs. UK
24 Slave Trade Wars in Sudan 1878-9 Egypt vs. Sudan
25 French Conquest of Tunisia 1881 France vs. Tunisia
26 First Mahdist War 1881-5 Egypt, UK vs. Sudan
27 French Conquest of Western Sudan 1881-98 France, Senegal vs. Sudan
28 First Italian-Abyssinian War 1887 Ethiopia vs. Italy
29 Mahdist-Italian War 1893-4 Italy vs. Sudan
30 Second Italian-Abyssinian War 1895-6 Ethiopia vs. Italy
31 Second Mahdist War 1896-9 Egypt, UK vs. Sudan
32 French Conquest of Chad 1897-1901 Chad vs. France, Senegal
33 French Conquest of Morocco 1903-14 Algeria, France vs. Morocco
34 Spanish-Moroccan War 1909-10 Morocco vs. Spain
35 Italian-Turkish War 1911-12 Italy vs. Turkey
Sub-Saharan Africa
36 Portugal’s Colonial Wars in Africa 1824 Angola, Mozambique, Guinea vs. Portugal
37 – 1842 –
38 – 1844 –
39 – 1846 –
40 – 1858-1915 –
Source: Clodfelter (2002).
Notes: See Data Appendix for construction method.
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Table 3, Continued: External Conflicts, 1816-1913
Conflict Years Participants and Coalitions
Sub-Saharan Africa, Continued
41 Kaffir Wars 1818-19 South Africa vs. UK
42 – 1834-5 –
43 – 1846-7 –
44 – 1850-3 –
45 – 1877-8 –
46 First Ashanti War 1824-6 Ghana vs. UK
47 Boer-Zulu War 1838 South Africa vs. UK
48 Second Ashanti War 1873-4 Ghana vs. UK
49 Zulu War 1879 South Africa vs. UK
50 First Boer War 1880-1 South Africa vs. UK
51 Franco-Dahomey Wars 1890 Benin vs. France
52 – 1892 –
53 Arab War 1892-4 Democratic Republic of the Congo vs. Belgium
54 Matabele War 1893 UK vs. Zimbabwe
55 Conquest of Madagascar 1894-9 France vs. Madagascar
56 Zanzibar War 1896 Tanzania vs. UK
57 Conquest of Benin 1897 Benin vs. UK
58 Second Boer War 1899-1901 South Africa vs. UK
59 Conquest of Kano and Sokoto 1903 Nigeria vs. UK
Middle East and Central Asia
60 Wahhabi War 1811-18 Egypt, Morocco, Turkey vs. Saudi Arabia
61 War Against Pirates of Oman 1819-21 Oman vs. UK
62 Russo-Persian War 1825-8 Iran vs. Russia
63 First Syrian War 1831-3 Egypt vs. Syria, Turkey
64 Persian-Afghan War 1836-8 Afghanistan vs. Iran
65 Second Syrian War 1839-41 Austria, Turkey, UK vs. Egypt, Syria
66 Russian Conquests in Central Asia 1847 Kazahkistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan vs. Russia
67 – 1864-76 –
68 – 1878 –
69 – 1878-81 –
70 – 1884-5 –
British Conflicts in and around the Indian Empire
71 Kandhian War 1815-18 Sri Lanka vs. UK
72 Gurkha War 1814-16 Nepal vs. UK
73 Third Maratha War 1817-18 India vs. UK
74 First Afghan War 1839-42 Afghanistan vs. UK
75 Sind War 1843 Pakistan vs. UK
76 Gwalior War 1843-4 India vs. UK
77 First Sikh War 1845-6 India, Pakistan vs. UK
78 Second Sikh War 1848-9 India, Pakistan vs. UK
79 Anglo-Persian War 1856-7 Iran vs. UK
80 Umbeyla Campaign 1863 Pakistan vs. UK
Source: Clodfelter (2002).
Notes: See Data Appendix for construction method.
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Table 3, Continued: External Conflicts, 1816-1913
Conflict Years Participants and Coalitions
British Conflicts in and around the Indian Empire, Continued
81 Bhutan War 1864-5 Bhutan vs. UK
82 Second Afghan War 1878-80 Afghanistan vs. UK
83 Chitral Campaign 1895 Pakistan vs. UK
84 Northwest Frontier Campaign 1897-8 Pakistan vs. UK
East Asia
85 Campaigns in Kashgaria 1825-31 China vs. Kazahkstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
86 Opium War 1839-42 China vs. UK
87 Arrow War 1856-60 China vs. France, UK
88 Sino-Japanese War 1894-5 China vs. Japan
Southeast Asia and Oceania
89 First Burma War 1824-6 Myanmar vs. India, UK
90 Java War 1825-30 Indonesia vs. Netherlands
91 Australian Aboriginal Wars 1840-1901 Native Australians vs. Australia
92 Maori Wars 1843-6 Maoris vs. UK
93 – 1860-72 –
94 Second Burma War 1852-3 Myanmar vs. India, UK
95 Franco-Vietnamese War 1858-62 France vs. Vietnam
96 Aceh War 1873-1914 Indonesia vs. Netherlands
97 Tonkin War 1883-5 China,Vietnam vs. France
98 Third Burma War 1885 Myanmar vs. India, UK
99 Lombok Campaign 1894 Indonesia vs. Netherlands
100 Filipino-Spanish War 1896-8 Phillipines vs. Spain
101 Russo-Chinese War 1900 China vs. Russia
102 Russo-Japanese War 1904-5 Japan vs. Russia
United States and Canada
103 Texas War of Independence 1835-6 Mexico vs. USA
104 Mexican War 1846-8 Mexico vs. USA
105 Spanish-American War 1898 Spain vs. USA
106 Indian Wars in USA 1866-90 Native Americans vs. USA
107 Apache-Mexican Wars 1833 Mexico vs. Native Americans
108 – 1837 –
109 – 1838 –
110 – 1844 –
111 – 1846 –
112 – 1850-1 –
Carribean Region
113 Mexican War of Independence 1810-21 Mexico vs. Spain
114 Central American Wars 1822-39 Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua vs. each other
115 Yaqui-Mayo Wars 1825-7 Mexico vs. Native Americans
116 – 1867-8 –
117 – 1875-87 –
118 – 1899-1900 –
119 Pastry War 1838 France vs. Mexico
Source: Clodfelter (2002).
Notes: See Data Appendix for construction method.
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Table 3, Continued: External Conflicts, 1816-1913
Conflict Years Participants and Coalitions
Carribean Region, Continued
120 Haitian-Dominican Wars 1844 Dominican Republic vs. Haiti
121 – 1845 –
122 – 1849 –
123 – 1854-6 –
124 Filibuster War 1856-7 Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras vs.
William Walker
125 War of the French Intervention 1862-7 Austria, Belgium, France vs. Mexico
126 War of the Restoration 1863-5 Dominican Republic vs. Spain
127 Ten Years’ War 1868-78 Cuba vs. Spain
128 Central American War of 1876 1876 El Salvador, Honduras vs. Guatemala
129 Cuban War of Independence 1895-8 Cuba vs. Spain
130 Central American War of 1906 1906 El Salvador, Honduras vs. Guatemala
131 Central American War of 1907 1907 El Salvador, Honduras vs. Nicaragua
South America
132 South American Wars of Independence 1810-25 Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru,
Uruguay, Venezuela vs. Portugal, Spain
133 Brazilian War of Independence 1822-3 Brazil vs. Portugal
134 Argentine-Brazilian War 1825-8 Argentina vs. Brazil
135 Peruvian-Colombian War 1827-9 Bolivia, Colombia vs. Peru
136 War of the Confederation 1836-9 Argentina, Chile vs. Bolivia, Peru
137 Bolivian-Peruvian War 1841 Bolivia vs. Peru
138 Ecuadorian-Colombian War 1863 Colombia vs. Ecuador
139 Paraguayan War 1864-70 Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay vs. Paraguay
140 Naval War with Spain 1865-6 Peru vs. Spain
141 War of the Pacific 1879-84 Bolivia, Peru vs. Chile
Source: Clodfelter (2002).
Notes: See Data Appendix for construction method.
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Instrumental Variables and Related Controls
Mean Std Dev Min Max
Pre-Modern War Casualties 0.10 0.26 0 1.51
Total Number of Wars 3.57 5.69 0 43
Total Years at War 15.0 22.2 0 121
Share of Independence Wars 0.05 0.14 0 1
Share of Colonial Wars 0.21 0.38 0 1
Pre-Modern War Casualties, 1700-88 0.20 0.54 0 3.36
Pre-Modern Battle Deaths, COW 0.06 0.18 0 1.06
Sources: See Data Appendix.
Notes: Unless stated otherwise, the instruments were constructed using
1816-1913 data. There are 96 observations for each variable.
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Table 5: 2SLS Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares
log Y/L log Y/L log Y/L log Y/L log Y/L log Y/L log Y/L TFP
Direct Tax Share 4.98∗∗∗ 4.44∗∗∗ 4.24∗∗∗ 4.73∗∗∗ 5.30∗∗∗ 4.12∗∗ 1.81∗∗∗
(1.16) (1.19) (1.36) (1.31) (1.32) (1.70) (0.62)






Government Size −1.01 −1.59
(1.37) (1.25)
Trade Openness 0.55∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.19)
Area −0.05 −0.05∗ −0.04 −0.05 −0.03 −0.02 0.07∗ −0.02∗
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01)
Continents Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: First Stage
Direct Direct Direct Direct Direct Direct Taxes to Direct
Share Share Share Share Share Share GDP Share
Pre-Modern War Casualties 0.16∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗





Government Size −0.46∗∗∗ −0.48∗∗∗
(0.16) (0.17)
Trade Openness 0.02∗∗ 0.04
(0.03) (0.03)
Area 0.02∗ 0.02 0.02∗ 0.02∗ 0.02∗ 0.02 −0.004∗∗ 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.002) (0.01)
Continents Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Angrist-Pischke F-Test 11.49∗∗∗ 11.67∗∗∗ 8.27∗∗∗ 13.20∗∗∗ 11.14∗∗∗ 11.12∗∗∗ 10.32∗∗∗ 9.54∗∗∗
Adjusted R2 0.31 0.35 0.33 0.35 0.30 0.41 0.18 0.34
No of Observations 96 96 95 96 96 95 87 72
Panel C: Ordinary Least Squares
Direct Tax Share 3.99∗∗∗ 3.51∗∗∗ 3.76∗∗∗ 3.72∗∗∗ 3.93∗∗∗ 3.04∗∗∗ 0.83∗∗∗
(0.50) (0.45) (0.45) (0.65) (0.46) (0.47) (0.16)
Total Taxes to GDP 5.79∗∗∗
(1.58)
***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 6: 2SLS Regressions with Alternative IVs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares (Dependent Variable is log Y/L)
Direct Tax Share 4.54∗∗∗ 5.82∗∗∗ 4.29∗∗∗ 6.22∗∗∗ 7.90∗∗∗
(1.27) (1.48) (1.44) (1.30) (2.81)
Total Number of Wars −0.09 −0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Total Years at War 0.004 0.010∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Share of Independence Wars −0.46 −0.31
(0.65) (0.53)
Share of Colonial Wars −0.52∗ −0.80∗∗
(0.29) (0.34)
Area −0.05 −0.07 −0.06∗ −0.07 −0.10
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.07)
Continents Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: First Stage (Dependent Variable is Direct Tax Share)
Pre-Modern War Casualties 0.14∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Total Number of Wars 0.001 0.003
(0.004) (0.004)
Total Years at War 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Share of Independence Wars 0.29∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.09)
Share of Colonial Wars −0.08 −0.09∗
(0.05) (0.05)
Pre-Modern War Casualties, 1700-88 0.09∗∗∗
(0.03)
Pre-Modern Battle Deaths, COW 0.14∗
(0.08)
Area 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02∗ 0.02∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Continents Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Angrist-Pischke F-Test 6.60∗∗∗ 10.52∗∗∗ 6.45∗∗∗ 12.39∗∗∗ 3.21∗
Adjusted R2 0.29 0.36 0.36 0.31 0.27
Number of Observations 96 96 96 96 96
Panel C: Ordinary Least Squares
Direct Tax Share 3.92∗∗∗ 3.77∗∗∗ 3.53∗∗∗ 3.99∗∗∗ 3.99∗∗∗
(0.49) (0.49) (0.48) (0.50) (0.50)
***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 7: Robustness Checks for 2SLS Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares (Dependent Variable is log Y/L)
Direct Tax Share 4.14∗∗∗ 5.40∗∗∗ 5.23∗∗∗ 4.86∗∗∗ 5.52∗∗∗
(1.35) (1.43) (1.13) (1.10) (1.27)










Other Controls No Great
Powers
Area −0.08 −0.05 −0.05 −0.04 −0.08∗
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Continents Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: First Stage (Dependent Variable is Direct Tax Share)
Pre-Modern War Casualties 0.17∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)










Other Controls No Great
Powers
Area 0.04∗∗∗ 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Continents Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Angrist-Pischke F-Test 6.13∗∗ 7.34∗∗∗ 9.51∗∗∗ 14.53∗∗∗ 9.97∗∗∗
Adjusted R2 0.35 0.46 0.32 0.34 0.30
No of Observations 90 75 91 96 96
Panel C: Ordinary Least Squares
Direct Tax Share 4.08∗∗∗ 3.53∗∗∗ 4.16∗∗∗ 4.05∗∗∗ 4.06∗∗∗
(0.53) (0.73) (0.48) (0.55) (0.51)
***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 7, Continued: Robustness Checks for 2SLS Regressions
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares (Dependent Variable is log Y/L)
Direct Tax Share 4.92∗∗∗ 5.49∗∗∗ 4.76∗∗∗ 5.53∗∗∗ 3.92∗∗∗
(1.10) (1.08) (1.16) (1.40) (1.41)
Technological Adoption in 1500
State Antiquity
Agricultural Transitions
Population Density in 1820
Fractionalization 0.11
(0.43)
Trust in People 1.08∗
(0.60)
Other Controls Legal Colonial Religion
Origins Origins
Area −0.05 −0.07 −0.05 −0.06 −0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Continents Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: First Stage (Dependent Variable is Direct Tax Share)
Pre-Modern War Casualties 0.16∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
Technological Adoption in 1500
State Antiquity
Agricultural Transitions
Population Density in 1820
Fractionalization −0.11
(0.07)
Trust in People 0.34∗∗
(0.13)
Other Controls Legal Colonial Religion
Origins Origins
Area 0.02∗ 0.02∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.02∗ 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Continents Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Angrist-Pischke F-Test 15.13∗∗∗ 9.33∗∗∗ 15.73∗∗∗ 8.55∗∗∗ 8.50∗∗∗
Adjusted R2 0.35 0.28 0.41 0.34 0.32
No of Observations 96 96 96 86 44
Panel C: Ordinary Least Squares
Direct Tax Share 3.63∗∗∗ 4.03∗∗∗ 3.39∗∗∗ 4.09∗∗∗ 2.96∗∗∗
(0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.56) (0.53)
***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
45
Table 8: Sensitivity Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: 2SLS Regressions from Table 5
Fiscal Capacity on 4.98∗∗∗ 4.44∗∗∗ 4.24∗∗∗ 4.73∗∗∗ 5.30∗∗∗ 4.12∗∗ 7.31∗∗∗ 1.81∗∗∗
Performance (1.16) (1.19) (1.36) (1.31) (1.32) (1.70) (1.85) (0.62)
War Casualties on 0.16∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗
Fiscal Capacity (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
Latitude Yes Yes
Democracy Yes Yes
Government Size Yes Yes
Trade Openness Yes Yes
Area Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continents Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ση Panel B: Percentage of Confidence Intervals over which β Is Always Positive
0.0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
0.1 100 100 98 100 100 77 100 81
0.2 99 93 84 93 99 64 97 68
0.3 93 84 74 84 93 61 90 62
0.4 86 78 68 77 86 57 83 59
0.5 81 72 65 72 81 56 78 58
0.6 77 68 63 68 77 54 75 56
0.7 74 67 62 67 73 54 71 56
0.8 70 64 60 64 71 54 69 55
0.9 69 63 58 64 69 53 66 54
1.0 67 62 58 63 67 53 65 53
***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%
Notes: See Table 5 for details.
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